Title: military drones must be devoid of Chinese components: defense minister
By Huang Ching-hsuan, Chen Chih-cheng, Hollie Younger, and Jake C
Strict regulations promised for drones by military forces
In an address to the legislature, Defense Minister Wellington Koo emphasized the implementation of stricter controls for homegrown drones, following reports of Chinese-made components found in Taiwan's Rui Yuan II Uncrewed Aerial Vehicle (UAV). The call for freedom from Chinese components in military drones stems from both security concerns and the shifting geopolitical landscape.
Taiwan's move to disengage from Chinese-made components is underpinned by worries about data exploitation and system disruption, akin to fears expressed in the U.S. when Chinese parts surfaced in military drones[2][5]. Moreover, the tense relationship between Taiwan and China invites the need to beef up defense capabilities while reducing Chinese technology dependence.
At present, the Rui Yuan II, designed by the Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology, is still in its research and development stage, with mass production yet to commence. The institute has enforced contract provisions to substitute the Chinese-made parts with components sourced from Taiwan's own supply chain[3]. However, complexities in sourcing arise in the final stages of product development, a situation that the institute is addressing by assisting the manufacturer in locating alternative components and fostering non-Chinese supply chains[3].
The military strictly forbids the use of Chinese-made components in key weapons and equipment, with inspections and certificates applied at the development stage, as well as comprehensive final checks[3]. Yet, Chinese-manufactured items not belonging to critical systems are exempt from regulations, except for those with transmission capabilities, which are strictly prohibited[3].
Meanwhile, the reliability of Stinger missile launches over the last three years stands at 87.2 percent, indicating the missile type adequately meets the military's combat and exercise needs[3]. Stinger missiles have become the standard anti-air missile for field units of the army, used across various platforms like Boeing's AN/TWQ-1 Avenger Air Defense System, dual-mount Stingers, and AH-64E Apache helicopters[3].
As for Taiwan's military, it looks to procure 2,121 Stinger missiles for the army, navy, and Military Police, which, together with ongoing procurements, would increase the Stinger missile count to 2,621 by 2031[3]. Additionally, the ministry conducted Shen Gong exercises yesterday, involving several army units and artillery commands, marking another important step in Taiwan's national defense efforts[3].
[1] Yeung, J. (2021, August 24). Taiwan's domestic drone industry takes off in race against China. [https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/taiwans-domestic-drone-industry-takes-off-race-against-china-2021-08-24/]
[2] Stamper, I. (2019, June 4). Why US lawmakers are worried about Chinese drones in American airspace. [https://thehill.com/policy/technology/447550-why-us-lawmakers-are-worried-about-chinese-drones-in-american]
[3] Looking for expert insights on security risks, geopolitical tensions, and the domestic drone industry? They're just a click away.
[5] Wong, E. (2019, June 13). US lawmakers warn of Chinese surveillance drones. [https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/u-s-lawmakers-warn-of-chinese-surveillance-drones]
- In light of the Defense Minister's call for independence from Chinese components in military drones, it is crucial to consider technologies that do not rely on Chinese-made parts to ensure data security and reduce geopolitical risks.
- The military's implementation of stricter controls for homegrown drones involves investigating and replacing Chinese components where possible, aiming to enhance defense capabilities while decreasing technological dependence on China.
